Morocco surveillance report details spyware, hidden recordings and targeted journalists

A whistleblower account was tested against records and forensic evidence

Amnesty International released an investigation on October 1 alleging that Moroccan intelligence services used commercial spyware, physical access to devices, hidden cameras and microphones, phone-location data and informants against journalists and human-rights defenders. Amnesty says the work draws on testimony from a former surveillance operative identified as Safir, interviews with 10 targeted people, internal documents, independent sources and forensic analysis. Those are investigative findings, not a judicial determination that every described operation occurred exactly as alleged. [1][2][4]

The report describes remote infection with tools including Pegasus and physical access to devices at airports, repair shops and other locations. Amnesty says some phones were returned already compromised, while other operations relied on covert recording equipment or access to call and location data. Because the whistleblower's identity is protected, readers cannot independently examine his service record; Amnesty says it corroborated consequential claims before publication. [1][2][4]

The potential-target list is broader than confirmed device infections

Amnesty says it identified 103 phone numbers selected for potential targeting between September and December 2017: 65 people in civil society, including 34 rights defenders, 22 journalists, five lawyers and four academics; 25 political or public officials; five diplomats or representatives of international organizations; and eight people in other roles. Selection in a targeting system does not by itself prove that a device was successfully infected. [2][4]

The investigation includes journalist Omar Radi and economist and activist Fouad Abdelmoumni. It says surveillance was followed in some cases by prosecution, imprisonment, smear campaigns or exposure of private material. Those consequences vary by person and proceeding; the evidence does not establish that surveillance alone caused every later action. [1][4][5]

Government and vendor accountability questions remain open

Le Monde's reporting for a Forbidden Stories collaboration says the evidence includes procurement records and operational detail involving products linked to NSO Group, Memento Labs and Verint. Amnesty says it sent detailed findings to Moroccan authorities four weeks before publication and received no response. It also sought responses from companies named in the report; supplier statements do not resolve how any particular tool was deployed. [2][4]

The consortium did not detect Pegasus use in Morocco after autumn 2021, but that is not proof that surveillance stopped. Other techniques were reported later. Moroccan authorities have repeatedly denied illegal spyware use; Arabic-language coverage says no new official response had appeared. Arabic and French sources were reviewed in the original and summarized here in English. [4][6][3]

How the sources compare